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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS

I
Nancy Beth Cruzan and the Death of the Self
By
Jack W. Provonsha, M.D., Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus
Faculty of Religion
Lorna Linda University
Two issues seem destined to be
perennially before the Supreme Court of
the United States, in one form or another,
in the foreseeable future. Both have
been attracting an extraordinary amount
Jf interest from lawyers, ethicists, physicians, and ordinary citizens, an interest
mainly derived from the fact that they
express a profoundly divided country
with feelings running high on both sides.
Rarely has the makeup of the Court
seemed so pivotal.
These issues reflect a division within the
Court itselfwhich echoes the mood ofthe
country. Even though the Court has
spoken, the conflicts remain. Either the
decisions must perforce seem ambiguous, or one side or the other, perhaps
both, will feel that bad law has been
affirmed. Can one expect pro-choice,
abortion advocates to accept quietly a
Court decision that abandons Wade vs.
Roe, or that an affirmation of that earlier
Court decision is going to get the pro-life
forces off the streets and off the front
steps of "family planning" centers? Either
side is likely to catch its breath for a while
and then plunge anew into the fray.
The other issue, the right to die, while
generating less public heat at present is
in many ways just as crucial. It will
undoubtedly continue to be with us in
spite ofthe Court's non-decision regarding the case of persistent vegetative
\lancy Beth Cruzan. No clear consensus
was to be expected from the Court so
long as it reflected the lack of consensus
of the larger society.

What is often unrecognized is that the
tensions raised by these issues represent deep disagreements regarding the
theological and philosophical presuppositions underlying them. They have
long roots extending into the past. It is the
purpose of this paper to uncover these
roots and to suggest a point of view that,
superimposed upon them, could offer at
least a measure of hope for downshifting
the current tension level.
At issue is the central question, "What
constitutes a human being?" My former
teacher, Paul Lehmann, then of Harvard
Divinity School, defined the ethical enterprise in terms of that question. Lehmann
wrote in his Ethics In A Christian Context
that ethics has to do with "what God is
doing in the world to make and to keep
human life human." Hovering in the
immediate background of an ethic so
defined there lies, of course, another
even more fundamental question. "What
do we mean when we say human?" How
we answer this question will determine
how we deal with the pressing issues at
both the beginning and ending edges of
life.
Dr. Joseph Fletcher, one of America's
pioneer Protestant bioethicists, once
wrote:
In biomedical ethics writers constantly say that we need to explicate
humanness or humaneness, what it
means to be a truly human being, but
they never follow their admission of
the need with an actual inventory or

profile, no matter how tentatively offered. Yet this must be done, or at least
attempted.
Then Dr. Fletcher, typically never hesitant about rushing past timorous angels,
proposed his own tentative profile. It
contained fifteen positive and five negative criteria. They ranged from minimal
intelligence to possessing neocortical
function, with a variety of features we
usually associate with human as contrasted with subhuman animals, in between. (The boldness with which he
categorized humanness on the IQ scale
was astonishing. Below twenty an individual is not a person. Between twenty
and forty he is questionably a person.)
Reactions to his article were both
immediate and forceful. After considerable give-and-take Dr. Fletcher settled
on the possession of neocortical function
as the fundamental humanizing trait.
Whether or not we consider Dr. Fletcher
as having been successful, his attempt
was not misplaced. He was correct in
saying that at least we must try. What
follows is offered as such an effort.
There are three ways of understanding humanity that condition the present
situation. The oldest came to be associated with the name of Greek philosopher Plato, not because he originated
the idea but because he gave it one of its
clearest early expressions. Listen to him
in his Socratic dialogue, Phaedo.
Socrates, who is preparing to drink the
continued on page 2

lethal hemlock, is conversing with his
disciples who are anguished at his imminent departure. He is trying to reassure
them:
"Well then," added Socrates, "let us
suppose that there are two sorts of
existence-one seen, the other unseen ... and further, is not one part of us
body, another part soul?"
"To be sure."
"And to which class is the body
more alike and akin?"
"Clearly to the seen-no one can
doubt that."
"And is the soul seen or not seen?"
"Not by man, Socrates."
"That soul, I say, herself invisible,
departs to the invisible world-to the
divine and immortal and rational:
.. .Then when death attacks a man, the
mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at
the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound."
Later, Crito is concerned about the
burial of Socrates.
"We shall try our best to do as you
say," said Crito, "but how shall we bury
you?"
"Any way you like," replied Socrates,
"that is, if you can catch me and I don't
slip through your fingers." He laughed
gently as he spoke, and turning to us
went on: "I cannot persuade Crito that I
am this Socrates who is here talking to
you ... ; he thinks I am the one whom he
will see presently lying dead.... You
must give assurance to Crito for
me ... that when I am dead I shall not
stay but depart and be gone. That will
help Crito to bear more easily ... when
he sees my body being burned or
buried, as if something dreadful were
happening to me .... No, you must keep
up your spirits and say that it is only my
body that you are burying; and you can
bury it as you please."
This is Platonic dualism. What it really
represents, however, is a monistic reduction of the essential man to a soul or
psyche. A modern expression of this
psychic reduction is provided by Elisa-
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beth Kubler-Ross, of Death and Dying
fame, who speaks of having collected
cases from all over the world, "hundreds
of cases from Australia to California," all
sharing a common denominator:

feet above her body and had only one
need, one wish-to tell them down
there, "Cool it, relax, take it easy, it's
OK."
Similar accounts are fairly common.

They are all aware of shedding their
physical body. And death, as we
understand it in scientific language,
does not really exist. Death is simply a
shedding of the physical body like the
butterfly coming out of a cocoon ... the
only thing you lose is something you
don't need anymore, and that is your
physical body. It is like putting away
your winter coat when spring comes
and you know that the coat is too
shabby to wear it anymore. That's
virtually what death is all about."
The cases to which Kubler-Ross
refers are autoscopic, "near-death"
experiences of individuals who have
been resuscitated from cardiac or pulmonary arrest, and the like. About ten
percent of such persons report variations on a theme provided by one of
Kubler-Ross's patients:
Mrs. S had been in and out of the
intensive-care unit 15 times, never
expected to live, but always made a
comeback. In one of her hospitalizations she could not get to Chicago, and
she was hospitalized at a local hospital. She remembers being put in a
private room, very close to death, and
could not make up her mind whether
she should call the nurse because she
suddenly sensed that she was moments away from death. One part of
her wanted very much to lean back in
the pillows and finally be at peace. But
the other part of her needed to make it
through one more time because her
youngest son was not yet of age.
Before she made a decision to call the
nurse, a nurse apparently walked into
her room, took one look at her, and
dashed out.
At that moment, she saw herself
floating a few feet above her body. She
was very surprised at seeing her
corpse in that bed. She made funny
remarks about how pale she looked,
and then to her utter amazement, she
described in minute details how they
worked on her, who was in the room
first, who was last, what they wore,
what they said-she even repeated a
joke of one of the residents who was
very apprehensive and started to joke.
In the meantime, while everybody
worked very desperately to bring her
back to physical life she floated a few

Unfortunately for a literal interpretation
of these psychic reductions there are a
number of other circumstances besides
resuscitation from "near-death" that can
produce the phenomenon-anesthesia,
psychedelic drugs such as LSD, a variety of other toxic substances. One
patient I interviewed had a small pituitary
tumor. His only apparent abnormal finding was an elevated serum prolactin
level. Fifteen times over a ten-year period he had out-of-the-body experiences.
These ceased after the removal of his
tumor. One of my medical students confessed to experiencing out-of-the-body
autoscopy on five different occasions for
no reason he could think of. They just
happened; no drugs, no anesthesia, no
tumors, no near-death.
One study suggests a naturalistic
explanation. L. J. Meduna repeatedly
encountered the phenomenon with his
experiments on the effects of administration of various levels of carbon-dioxide
on otherwise normal subjects. Since
carbon-dioxide is one of the products 0
tissue metabolism, loss of circulation as
in cardiac arrest could produce an
accumulation of this substance, at least
until such metabolism ceased-long
enough to produce illusions or hallucinations to be subsequently recalled.
Whatever the explanation, these
experiences suggest an understanding
of man in which he is only loosely and
temporarily associated with a material
body. The ethical questions arising from
this point of view have to do with when
that association begins and when it ends
and are asked such as "When does life
begin?" and "When does life end?"
An opposing understanding of man,
while not confined to it, is largely a child
of our modern scientific, materialistic,
world-view. In this view, man is essentially little more than a functioning material
body. We speak of this as a somatic
reduction. From this perspective questions regarding the beginning and ending of life are questions directed at the
material body. The beginning may be
considered in terms of developmental
m atu rity. At the end ing, all present defi nitions of death are somatic definitionscellular disintegration death, organ sys·
tem death with its loss of vital signs, ana

Continued on page 7

Ethics Courses:
Useless
New York Times, Nov. 15, 1989

By
Michael Levin
Let a stockbroker be arrested for shady dealing or a new medical
rocedure pose unanticipated dilemmas, and there arises a deand for a course in ethics. Law schools, medical schools, business
schools - even high schools - are urged to stem a supposed
flood of immorality by instituting the study of right and wrong. Unfortunately, however, these ethics courses are an utterly pointless
exercise.
The idea behind them is that anyone can be taught to distinguish
right from wrong in much the way medical students are taught to
distinguish the pancreas from the liver.
In the typical course, the center of pedagogic gravity is the case
study. Maya poor man steal medicine for his ailing wife? Should
the young mother of three or the productive scientist get the only
dialysis machine? Having mastered moral distinctions from this
regimen, the graduate is then supposed able to recognize (and
resist) a dubious deal or an improper request from a superior.
But this whole exercise rests on a mistake about what makes
people good. Moral behavior is the product of training, not reflection. As Aristotle stressed thousands of years ago, you get a good
adult by habituating a good child to do the right thing. Praise for
truth-telling and sanctions for fibbing will, in time, make him "naturalIy" honest.

"Telling right from wrong in
everyday life is not that
hard; the hard part is overcoming laziness and cowardice."

Indeed, abstract knowledge of right and wrong no more contributes to character than knowledge of physics contributes to bicycling. The idea in both cases is to build the proper responses into
nerve and sinew: Bicyclists don't have to think about which way
to lean and honest men don't have to think how to answer under
oath.
There is certainly a place for philosophical reflection on the existence and nature of values. But its practical significance is nil.
Telling right from wrong in everyday life is not that hard; the hard
part is overcoming laziness and cowardice to do what one perfectly
well knows one should. As every parent learns, only good examples
and apt incentives can induce that strength.
Psychologists have laboriously rediscovered the common sense
observation that children first conceive morality as rules for pleasing their parents - only with the fullness of time comes a grasp
of the idea of conscientious choice.
For this very reason, conscience cannot be hurried into being
by exposing children to hard, unclear examples for which they are
unready. Honesty may not always be the best policy, but telling
a child as much only confuses him. To stick, morality must be taught
as if absolute; life will supply the qualifications.
So ethics education carries more disquieting implications than
merely the waste of everyone's time. The hard cases meant to shatter student complacency invariably involve conflict between conventional principles, such as property rights and life-saving in the
case of the sick wife. Dwelling on these conflicts strongly suggests
that conventional morality is incoherent and, consequently, not rationally binding. Ethics education thereby provides one more
excuse for shirking one's plain duties.
Second, the examples typical of ethics education courses divert
attention from the content of morality proper. Moral character does
not require any particular stance on any public issue, be it pollution or apartheid. Honesty, industry and respect for others form
the gyroscope that stabilizes an individual on his journey through
life, not an itinerary of policy positions.
Yet ethics education, inspired as it is by public events, tends to
focus on public action: How should profit be weighed against pollution? When maya government official blow the whistle? These are
interesting and difficult questions but are not likely to be faced by
many people.
Less intriguing but cumulatively more important for the character
of society are each day's micro-challenges, such as deciding
whether to save a Christmas bonus or go on a spree.
A complex world does present special moral puzzles. But ethics
educators risk being so many Poloniuses, adding nothing to the
subjects they address while discrediting counsel itself.

3

Teaching Ethics Is Vital
By
Sydney Allen, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy and
Religious Studies
San Bernardino Valley College
San Bernardino, California
Can "bioethics" be taught? What is "bioethics"? It is the branch
of ethics that deals with questions of health, medicine, life and
death. Can "ethics" be taught? What is "ethics"? It is the branch of
philosophy that seeks to find a standard for human conduct.
Educators often divide the things that can be taught into
(a) cognitive; (b) affective and (c) skills domains.
Does the body of knowledge in ethics or moral philosophy
contain cognitive elements? Yes. The moral thought of Plato,
Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls is
cognitive, and can be explained, memorized, taught, and learned.
Does ethics contain an affective domain? Yes. People who
would apply moral thought usefully must have a "moral imagination," which comes down to the ability to trade places with another
person, possibly in another place and time, and to sympathize
and/or empathize with that person. Literature and art are useful in
this respect. Through the art of music, for instance, we can learn to
"feel with" the people who split Europe down the middle for the
sake of the reforms they "felt" necessary in the sixteenth-century
church: both the poetic text and the music of "A Mighty Fortress Is
Our God" offer us this opportunity.
Is there a skill component in ethics? Yes. If we are to use the
utilitarian calculus passed on to us by Mill and his disciples, we
must learn to find the net balance of some value (pleasure, for
example) vis-a-vis its co-ordinate disvalue (pain, for example) that
is likely to result from the various acts that are available to us in
response to a particular situation. If there is no such net balance of
value, we must be able to reject the act in question. If we are to use
the deontological system passed on to us by such thinkers as Kant
and Rawls, we must be able to explain how the "sacrifices," that is,
discomforts, suffered by lawyers, doctors, and undertakers are
somehow compensated for by the increased earnings these people currently get in our society, whereas the "sacrifices" that
slaves were once called upon to suffer were not compensated
with the coin of advantage that their labors gave society. There is,
in other words, a kind of calculus in moral matters that both the Mill
and Kant traditions require one to master.

"The institution where moral virtue is
learned is much less often the school than
it is the family."
But, having mastered the cognitive, affective, and skills
domains within the subject matter of ethics, will the student be a
better person, citizen, parent, child, and so forth? Possibly not.
Worse still, those who do master the lessons can, if they have a
bad will, turn what they have learned to the purposes of crime. We
are on the borderline of family and religion here, where they
overlap philosophy.
That, it seems to me, is the point that Professor Levin is trying to
make. He may have had in mind the recent injection into schools
that turn out MBAs of courses in "Business Ethics" in the hope that
the graduates who take these diplomas out onto the trading floors
of Wall Street will refrain from fraud and insider trading.
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He suggests that such courses are virtually useless in that kind
of situation, and he is probably near the truth. Schools that train
MBAs are teaching people how to make as much profit as possible in a situation, and when one of the classes suggests that on(
ought to take less profit than possible-for the sake of morality-iL
is not as likely to govern the conduct of the students in later life as
are the other classes that tell them how to take over companies,
turn them into "cash cows," and milk them for profit.
Can "virtue" be taught? Can honesty, kindness, and courage be
taught? Let us distinguish between what we may call "didactic"
and "apprenticeship." Logic and Chemisty are most appropriately taught by a teacher lecturing, explaining, and drilling students on the body of knowledge represented in these fields.
Aspects of clinical medicine and violin-bow making are more
appropriately taught by apprenticeship, that is, by novices observing masters, then trying the procedure under the direction of the
master and eventually becoming masters themselves. The latter
resembles a home or a priory more than a lecture hall.
As Professor Levin suggests, the institution where moral virtue
is learned is much less often the school than it is the family itself,
where most commonly it is learned (if it is learned) by daughters
from their mothers and by sons from their fathers. The family in
which mothers, fathers, sons and daughters engage in this vital
learning process is not, as some have claimed to believe, a
dispensable, expendable institution for humanity. Those who are
acquainted with such influential moral codes as the Ten Commandments will not be surprised to be told this. One of the important rules of the Mosaic Law commands sons and daughters to
honor their fathers and mothers. Many sons and daughters
have been forced, for one reason or another, to do without their
birth mothers or birth fathers or both, but it is not until recently that
people have begun to argue that those bereaved children were
not harmed thereby. The family square-mother, father, daugh
ters, sons-has proved its usefulness in the past and continue~
to prove it today. Virtuous parents tend to be blessed with virtuous
children. The transmission of the virtue is not by didactic but
by imitation. Rudyard Kipling spoke to this issue in one of his
"Stalky and Company" stories. He describes a talk given at college by an "impeccably conservative M.P." on the subject of the
virtue of patriotism:
With a large and healthy hand he tore down ... veils, and
trampled them under the well-intentioned foot of eloquence. In a
raucous voice he cried aloud little matters like the hope of
Honour and the dream of Glory, that boys do not discuss even
with their most intimate equals .... He pointed to them shining
goals, with fingers which smudged out all radiance on all horizons. He profaned the most secret places of their souls with
outcries and gesticulations(1).
Immanuel Kant claimed that the only thing that can, without
condition, be called "good" is a good will. The process of the
formation of such a benign will is probably destined to remain
behind the veils to which Kipling points. Its importance, however,
cannot be too highly rated, and neither can the importance of
whole families with good mothers and fathers as the workshop
where it is learned.
Can bioethics be taught? Certainly. Teaching ethics is vital and
helpful, but it has little to do with the formation of virtue. For that we
must look to our parents and our religious life.

Endnotes
1. Carrington, C.E., The Life of Rudyard Kipling (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 218. The
quotation is from "Stalky and Company."

A Medical Ethics Course?
By
Cynthia Gordon, Ph. D.
Lecturer
Department of Philosophy
University of California/Riverside
The anti-academic academician is a frequent visitor to the
op-ed pages. He delights the general reader by reinforcing the
view that "book learning" is largely futile and what really counts
are the down-to-earth, common-sensical lessons of "the real
world." If anything, he suggests, academic study blurs the clear
vision of plain experience. Such a writer may begin with a legitimate point. But he has so much fun tweaking the noses of his
colleagues that the message becomes a series of cheap shots.
Consider the example of Michael Levin's essay "Ethics
Courses: Useless." In the middle of his discussion, he invokes
Aristotelian ethical theory, but offers an account of it that has more
in common with the views of B. F. Skinner than those of Aristotle. In
his distaste for "intellectualizing" about morals, Levin forgets that
Aristotle distinguished between an acquired pattern of correct
behaviors and an intelligent grasp of ethical principles, arguing
that moral life in the fullest sense required both. Even more fundamentally, Aristotle's view of ethical development is not the only
game in town. Whether in the history of moral philosophy or in
contemporary psychology, there are equally attractive theories
stressing a cognitive or affective interpretation of how one
becomes an ethical being.
Elsewhere in his essay, Levin faults academic study of ethics for
suggesting "that conventional morality is incoherent." Often, however, that is the problematic truth. Popular morality and individual
moral codes are frequently lacking in basic, explanatory principles. The ethics of a person or a group may consist of a bundle of
moral opinions that include contradictions and absurdities
("Respect life or I'll kill you!"). Those of us who teach basic ethics
courses urge our students not to give up their convictions, but to
systematize them, to work toward clarity and coherence in their
functioning as ethical persons. The study of theories and the
analysis of value dilemmas is not to create confusion, but to
resolve it.
It is tempting to go after Levin's article line by line. However, our
primary focus here is the question "Can Biomedical Ethics Be
Taught?" If such study is not "an utterly pointless exercise," what
does it accomplish? Levin would argue quite correctly that a
bioethics course cannot make a bad person good. It cannot transform a sociopathic medical student into a morally sensitive physician. What can occur will depend on the nature ofthe course. I, for
example, can only describe the aims of my own medical ethics
classes, an agenda that succeeds just often enough to keep the
instructor hopeful.

"Right living or ethics has first to do with
good habits."
While it is true that no academic experience ever devised can
compel a moral sensitivity where none exists, that is not the
..Iproblem with the vast majority of students. They want to be good
people. They want, in their personal, communal, and future professional lives, to believe that they are acting rightly. They are,
however, ethically naive in several senses. First, as is often the

case with everyday morality, they do not fully understand their own
system of value judgment. They are unable to articulate its fundamental principles or explain the decision-making process in individual cases. More fundamentally, they are only dimly aware of the
problematic nature of "moral reasoning," of the difficulties inherent
in conflicts of ethical points of view. Applied ethics, then, cannot
consist simply in classroom discussions of "hot" moral questions.
Such exchanges result in neither clarification nor understanding.
Instead, the first order of business should be to explore the nature
of values and the problems of meaning and validation of moral
claims. The second major task, I believe, is a survey ofthe various
traditional approaches to moral judgment. In this way, students

"A rational understanding of various ethical traditions enables us to approach
these debates with sensitivity and a spirit
of cooperation."
begin to see ethics not as a jumble of personal sentiments
gathered from who knows where, but as a systematic, reasoned
approach to fundamental questions. They also begin to see their
own values in relation to these systems. The student who vaguely
justifies a course of action "because it's better for everybody
involved" comes to understand the structure of utilitarianism.
Another who disapproves of a behavior because "it's against
nature, isn't it?" gains a much richer, clearer idea of what this
means. Personally, I cherish the conviction that such enhanced
understanding improves one's ethical functioning in "real life."
With a reasoned grasp on basic principles and a sense of the
process of applying them to situations, one's moral choices are
more likely to be part of a coherent whole. The individual trades
paSSionate attachment to rubrics and slogans for thoughtful judgment. At the same time, systematic study of one's moral philosophy imparts awareness of its limits and vulnerabilities, thus making conflict and uncertainty a bit easier to understand.
A second important contribution of the applied ethics course is
the light it casts on one's adversaries in moral conflict. In a society
as astonishingly pluralistic as our own, conflicting value systems
hover around dozens of issues large and small. It does no good to
brandish phrases like "no decent person could approve ... " or
"everybody knows that you ought to .... " Michael Levin insists that
"telling right from wrong in everyday life is not that hard" and that
complacency-shattering conflicts between principles "are not
likely to be faced by many people." But what if two people are
approaching a relatively easy moral decision from two different
value systems, say, natural law versus divine command theory?
They will easily, confidently draw conflicting conclusions. Or all
parties may agree on principles but weigh and apply them differently when they conflict. Contra Levin, conflicting values are a
common feature of our moral life. And, thinking about the students
in a medical ethics course, such situations are inevitable in health
care where people of all sorts of backgrounds must come together
to make difficult, painful choices. A rational understanding of
various ethical traditions enables us to approach these debates
with sensitivity and a spirit of cooperation. The alternative is too
often the shrill, vindictive rhetoric that makes the current polarization within our community on the abortion issue.
A final point on the uses of applied ethics courses, particularly
the biomedical variety, concerns the development of personal
identity. Values and moral choices are intensely important to our
sense of self, of who we are. Exploration of these issues can be a
powerful tool for developing self-awareness. No doubt Michael
Levin would find this claim much too "touchy-feely." Isn't this a lot
5

of navel contemplation? What's the point of examining ethics as a
key to one's own nature? Why not just get on with life?
As the philosopher said, "the unexamined life is not worth
living." People absorbed in high-pressure preparation for a prestigious career have precious little time for examination of themselves or their goals. "Do I really want to do this?" "Why have I
chosen this goal?" "What approach is best suited to the person I
am?" "What other things are important to me?" Too often these
questions go unasked; and, as a result, there are a lot of unhappy
professionals out there.
To me, the best unforeseen dividend of the medical ethics
course is the reflection it encourages in many students. Why do I
think that? an individual may ask. And what does it mean in terms
of the way I want to live my life and the person I want to be? Against
Michael Levin, I would argue that the "practical significance" of
"philosophical reflection on the existence and nature of values" is
profound and invaluable.

Is There No Place For Reason?
By
James W. Walters, Ph. D.
Associate Professor of Christian Ethics
Faculty of Religion
Lorna Linda University
Michael Levin in his popular piece "Can Ethics Be Taught?"
paints a morally insightful picture using hyperbole and caricature.
First, the painter's bold language: "Ethics courses are an utterly
pointless exercise." "Abstract knowledge of right and wrong no
more contributes to character than knowledge of physics contributes to bicycling."
Second, the artist's compelling message: What society needs is
citizens with character, and character comes from good parenting
more than ethics classes.
Levin, like a political cartoonist, makes his pointthrough overkill.
Fine, let's just distinguish the message from the medium-even if
the writer doesn't.
In my mind's eye I can see how Levin's words might yield a
two-phase cartoon. Scene one: a professor leading 25 medical
students in an animated analysiS of a case study-but in the
cartoon, the whole scene existing under a big X, with the caption,
"Just Say No." Scene two: big daddy making clear, plodding
footprints across the room, with little tyke, shin-to-heel, dutifully
in footsteps.
The big daddy-little tyke scene has much going for it.
The ethical life, essentially, is not logical reasoning about difficult moral issues. Much more basically, it is a fitting life which flows
from our character-which you and I inherited and learned before
we could begin to choose and sort. Beginning in infancy we
receive certain subjective feelings and predispositions which are
indelibly set. We don't wait until we are 12-or 18-and then
choose the sort of persons we will become! Long before that time,
our basic emotions are set. And those emotions-to a great
extent-are us. Emotions are predispositions which determine
how we will fear, hate, love, enjoy, feel guilt and shame. We don't
choose the blueprint of our character, much as we might in deciding on a house style. We, to a great extent, receive it. Aristotle was
correct: right living or ethics has first to do with good habits. These
habits are not cognitive activities, but are ingrained emotional
responses. And the habits of the heart are first set by parental
6

example and discipline. More than most of us realize, we are chips
off "the ole block" -or at least off other blocks. We humans are
incredibly social beings.
But is there no place for reason? Isn't the feature which sets us
apart from the lower animals our capacity for reason? Absolutely,
but in a significant sense, cognitive reason is a subset of a more
total organism. It doesn't exist aside from our emotions, but
alongside them. Reason hopefully guides them, but surely it does
not undergird them.

"The ethical life ... is a fitting life which
flows from our character-which you and I
inherited and learned before we could
begin to choose and sort."
Take the emotions of guilt and shame-emotions which are
indispensable to the moral life. These emotions are universal,
appearing in us as children. It is precisely these emotions which
psychopaths lack in significant ways. A psychopath may have
very sophisticated reasoning-may score high on Kohlberg's
moral development scale! High IQ and reasoning ability do not
necessarily yield good ethics.
We must not attempt to divorce emotion from reason. Their
complementarity is natural. In the words of psychologist Sidney
Callahan our brain stores information as "cognitive-affective constructs." Have you ever been grasping for recall of an event or
idea-it won't come back, but you immediately sense a feeling
tone about that thing that still eludes your cognition? That image
you are grasping is either positive or negative, affirming or
threatening-and then your mind latches onto the image, and your
feelings were right, even before you had the rational substance!
The big daddy-little tyke scene, I was saying, has much going
for it. But I'm sorry, Mr. Levin, it isn'tthe whole story. As loveable as
little tykes are, who wants to remain one forever? Yes, the character blueprint is determined early, and that blueprint is essentialbut you might wantto later make some modifications-knock out a
wall, reconstruct the kitchen, even add a room. It's still the same
house, but for good reasons it's been modified.
Let me return to and build on-and conclude with-the twophase cartoon metaphor. Yes, we walk in our parents' footsteps,
and gratefully so. But who wants to remain in infancy-as wellwired as the infant may be! Later, to sit in a circle discussing ethics
can be an intellectual feast for mature adults who realize that
moral life can be delightfully-sometimes dreadfully-complex.

"Exploration of these issues can be
a powerful tool for developing selfawareness."
A decent ethics class, Mr. Levin, builds on good, emotion-based
habits. It doesn't offer simple, pop answers to public issues. A
good ethics class accomplishes at least three things: It stimulates
the moral imagination; it hones moral analysis; it elicits a sense of
moral obligation.
Moral imagination. Why are the habits my parents taught me
good? Are they good for all people in all times? In what ways is the
moral life a boon to happiness rather than a drag on life's joy? Is
self-fulfillment enhanced by-or deterred by-the fulfillment of
others' legitimate interests? Is ethical reflection merely needed in
life's big dilemmas, or do countless decisions-big and smallhave an ethical component?

(

Moral analysis. In a recent discussion of euthanasia, a student
sincerely cited the 6th commandment as the Christian answer to
the issue. Upon further analysis and discussion several rather
rucial discoveries were made:
-A ban on killing is not absolute in the Bible; God commanded
deaths in certain circumstances.
-The word "kill" in the commandment is better translated
as "murder."
-Personal life is sacred because it is created in God's image.
-Euthanasia is not mentioned in the Bible; and the related notion
of suicide is not discussed, but stories of suicide are told without
conclusions about the rightness/wrongness of the practice.
Moral obligation. To openly discuss good and bad, right and
wrong, principles and virtues, is to implicitly teach obligation-that
we are obliged to do the right, to be good persons. Will ethics
classes make morally superior students? Not necessarily. For

ethics presupposes personal freedom and responsibility; further,
ethics classes are only one influence among so many in determining behavior. Ethics classes can-and there is some evidence
that they do-influence students to join in respectful, principled
deliberation about particular cases which arise in, e.g., a hospital
setting. This in itself is a significant contribution.
Finally, can ethics be taught? Yes. Most basically in the home.
But significantly for the inquiring adult in the classroom as well.

References: "Ethics Courses: Useless," New York Times, November 25,1989; Daniel Callahan, "Goals in the Teaching of Ethics,"
in Ethics Teaching in Higher Education, Daniel Callahan and
Sissela Bok, eds., NY: Plenum Press, 1980; Sidney Callahan,
"The Role of Emotion in Decisionmaking," Hastings Center
Report, June/July, 1988.

brain death characterized by total cessation of function from the neck up, including the brain stem, and all depend on
something that happens to a body. Man
as a "soma" is defined anatomically,
physiologically, and neurochemically,
and everything that happens to and
within him-thought, reason, emotion,
memory, living and dying-are all
)hysiologic, neurochemical events.
)
A third view of man which is gaining
increasing acceptance is expressed in
an address by professor Paul Tillich
delivered before the New York Society
for Clinical Psychiatry in 1960, under the
title, "The Meaning of Health." Tillich
said to the gathered doctors:

This point of view has increasingly
come to characterize the thought of a
number of individuals who were formerly
advocates of the somatic reduction.
Philosopher Karl Popper and neurophysiologist Sir John Eccles collaborated
a few years ago on a book bearing the
seminal title, The Self's Brain, a title
suggesting that the self is not identical
with or reducible to its chief organ-the
brain.
Neurophysiologist Roger Sperry ofthe
California Institute of Technology (Sperry
received one-half of a Nobel Prize for his
work on the commissurotomized brain)
discussed the new emphasis recently in
an article reproduced in The Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy. The article
was an extended version of his acceptance speech in Stockholm. In the article
Sperry says:

When I spoke of dimensions of life,
there was implied a rejection of the
phrase "levels of life." This must now
be made explicit. Man should not be
considered as a composite of several
levels, such as body, soul, spirit, but as
a multidimensional unity .... he is a unity
which unites all dimensions. This doctrine stands against the dualistic theory
which sees man as composed of soul
and body; or body and mind; or body,
soul, and spirit, etc. Man is one, uniting
within himself all dimensions of lifean insight which we partly owe to the
recent developments of medicine,
especially psychiatry. [He could have
added, recent theology and biblical
scholarship.] As confirmation of this
idea, one may refer to psycho-somatic
medicine. But although this is not
\ incorrect, one should not forget that a
hyphen between "psycho" and "somatic" represents the statement of a
problem and not a solution.

In essence, consciousness was
conceived to be a dynamic emergent
of brain activity, neither identical with,
nor reducible to, the neural events of
which it is mainly composed .... consciousness was not conceived as an
epiphenomenon, inner aspect, or other
passive correlate of brain processing
but rather to be an active integral part
of the process itself, exerting potent
causal effects in the interplay of
cerebral operations. In a position oftop
command at the highest levels in the
hierarchy of brain organization, the
subjective properties were seen to
exert control over the biophysical and
chemical activities at subordinate
levels .... On our new terms, consciousness, as a holistic systemic property
and an active dynamic part of highorder brain processing, is now put
within the province of science and is
something that cannot be ignored
where science wants an explanation

Cruzan -

continued

of higher brain activities. In effect, this
change means that the whole valuerich qualitative world of inner-conscious, subjective experience, the
world of the humanities, that has long
been explicitly excluded from the
domain of science on materialist principles, is now reinstated .... ln the present view, conscious phenomena are
different from, more than, and not
reducible to, neural events, though it is
correct to say that conscious phenomena are built of neural events as
elements and perhaps also of glial and
other cerebral events .... On the foregoing terms, psychology and psychiatry are best interpreted as distinct
disciplines in their own right, not reducible or identical to neuroscience or
behavioral biology. In other words,
The meaning of the message will not
be found in the chemistry of the
ink.' .. .The development of an inner
subjective world may thus be viewed
broadly as part of the evolutionary
process of freeing behavior from its
initial primitive stimulus-bound condition, providing increasing degrees of
freedom of choice and originative
central processing.
Unfortunately, as it relates to the ethical
issues met with at the edges of life, this
wholistic point of view has not yet made
its most serious impact-though we are
moving in that direction particularly in our
definition of death. For most of human
history, as well as today, death has been
thought of as something that happens to
a body, no more nor less. Death involved
the disintegration of body tissues or the
cessation of body organ-system functions. More recently, for a number of
reasons including the need for viable
organs for transplantation, the loss of
function of a specific organ, the brain,
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has gained legal currency. But death is
still defined in "thing" terms, death of the
whole brain including the brain stem.
This most recent definition, while providing the specificity that good law
requires (the criteria are sufficiently
rigorous that certainty is virtually assured)
leaves us in a position of practical
awkwardness in some situations where
we are unable to do what seems humanely appropriate to many of us. Karen
Quinlan and Nancy Beth Cruzan are
prime examples. What this paper is suggesting is that it may be time for us to
allow the philosophic developments of
recent years to affect our clinical and
legal judgment in perplexing circumstances such as these.
Were we to define death in wholistic
terms, that is, where the whole person is
thought of as being greater than the sum
total of its anatomic, physiologic, neurochemical parts, and is not reducible to
them, where the essential person is
conceived of in functional rather than
"thing" terms, an actual or potential self,
absolutely dependent upon its materialistic base but not the same thing as that
base, we might be able to bring a
measure of reason to the ethical process
in these matters.
How shall we characterize this essential self? First, we must recognize that the
self is like "mind" not a "thing" word; in
other words, not to be confused with
brain. The self consists of an actual or
potential complex of actions, interactions, and functions that include consciousness, self-consciousness (the self
is both aware and aware that it is aware),
volition, creativity, the capacity for choosing, for making decisions, for being
responsible, and possessing the capacity to interact with others possessing these
qualities and the surrounding real and imagined environment.
The death of the self, which is the
ultimate event toward which all of our
other current definitions of death may
pOint, occurs at the point where these
qualities are irrevocably lost-even if
much ofthe material base for life remains
intact-including a brain-stem. Somatic
death and self-death may occur at the
same time, and they often do. From a
wholistic standpoint, the self cannot survive the death of its chief bodily organ,
the brain. An accurate diagnosis of brain

death always implies self-death. But the
point is, for purposes of our present
discussion, the self may die before
somatic death, indeed perhaps a long
time before, as in the persistent vegetative state. Karen Quinlan suffered selfdeath 9 years before the death of her
body including her brain. One patient
survived a persistent vegetative state for
37 years and 111 days, not once during
that time exhibiting any evidence of
being a living self, and, we might add, it
was a meaningless and very costly 37plus years.
Nancy Beth Cruzan's case raises
special problems. Unlike many persistent vegetative cases, it is difficult to
know if Nancy Beth has any degree of
surviving se/fhood. To visitors and those
who attend her she seems alive. Her
eyes blink and she tends to follow
sounds and show other minimal evidences of responsiveness. Is this purely
reflex, and thus somatic, activity? Or is
Nancy Beth still "in there" somewhere?
Cruzan thus illustrates both the difficulty and danger of going down that
"slippery slope." It is usually not difficult
to determine brain death based on the
standard criteria. But se/fhood involves a
far more subtle and subjective decision.
Often the evidence is indirect, depending
on objective, somatic markers. Indeed, at
present, brain death may be the only
reliable marker of self-death we have,
since it always signals its presence. But
surely it may be possible in some
circumstances for something short ofthe
loss of everything from the neck up
(including brain-stem) to be accepted as
life's terminus. (It goes without saying, of
course, that the determination may call
for a reasonable lapse of time and a
shared judgment such as a hospital
ethics committee.) Surely it was not too
difficult a judgment to make in the case of
Karen Quinlan. It might not be too difficult, at least eventually, to make the
decision for Nancy Beth Cruzan either. In
the absence of certainty, benefit should,
of course, always be given to doubt. (At
the beginning of life it should not be
difficult to judge an anencephalic fetus or
infant as never even having a self in its
future.)
Even when the diagnosis of self-death
is fairly obvious, due to its inherent,
subjective subtleties, what comes after
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should be surrounded by precautions
not usually necessary when the determination is solely that of somatic death.
Even were it legal, surely anything,r
resembling active euthanasia would be
inappropriate. The right to die should
never include the right to be killed-for
the sake of all of us-and especially here
since the fact of death in self-dead
persons may often not be impelling to
everybody involved. Withdrawal of life
support, including forced feeding by
gastrostomy tube, when it becomes clear
that all we are doing is to sustain somatic
tissue meaninglessly and without hope
of a restoration of personal function, is a
different matter, provided the self-death
is generally agreed upon. The dead self
must "mean" corpse to the involved
persons before actions appropriate to a
corpse are carried out. This may call for
some fairly formalized, even ritualized,
actions such as a formal declaration of
death.
Obviously, it is going to take time,
education, changes in law, even a set of
formal criteria generally agreed upon
(such as the Harvard Criteria for braindeath), and perhaps some new laboratory
and other tests before society at large is
going to be ready to add self-death to the
list of death definitions. But there are
good reasons to start thinking about it.
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